May 082013
 May 8, 2013  Posted by  Court, Surveillance, U.S.

Orin Kerr writes:

I haven’t blogged recently on judicial decisions considering the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. As regular readers will recall, the “mosaic theory” is a term for the idea that long-term monitoring of a suspect can be a Fourth Amendment search even if short-term monitoring is not. Under this approach, which was suggested by the concurring opinions in United States v. Jones, surveillance and analysis of a suspect is outside the Fourth Amendment until it reaches some point when it has gone on for too long, has created a full picture of a person’s life (the mosaic), and therefore becomes a search that must be justified under the Fourth Amendment. I think the mosaic approach is a misstep for reasons I elaborated on in this article. And the handful of lower courts to have considered the theory since Jones mostly have not adopted it, either because they found it unpersuasive, because they distinguished Jones on the facts, or because they avoided the question under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F.Supp.2d 384 (D.Md. 2012).

In the last week, two district courts have divided on the question: United States v. Ringmaiden (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013), and United States v. Powell, — F.Supp.2d –, 2013 WL 1876761 (E.D. Mich May 3, 2013) In this post, I want to discuss the two rulings, and then offer some critical commentary on Powell at the end.

Read more on The Volokh Conspiracy.

Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.